Whether tradable permits are appropriate for use in transition and developing economies-given special social and cultural circumstances, such as the lack of institutions and lack of expertise with market-based policies-is much debated. We conducted interviews and surveyed a sample of firms subject to emissions trading programs in Santiago, Chile, one of the first cities outside the OECD that has implemented such trading. The information gathered allow us to study what factors affect the performance of the trading programs in practice and the challenges and advantages of applying tradable permits in less developed countries.
the survey. The last section reviews the lessons learned and concludes.
TRADING SCHEMES IN SANTIAGO: AN OVERVIEW
In 1992, a cap and trade scheme was implemented in Santiago to reduce emissions of particulate matter from large industrial and residential boilers. At that time, there was no environmental agency, so a new governmental office was created to manage this program. The "Program of Control of Emissions Coming from Stationary Sources" (PROCEFF), under the Department of Health (SEREMI, Secretaría Ministerial de Salud), was given the responsibility of allocating permits and keeping an up-to-date record of permits, as well as monitoring and enforcing emissions caps. Within a short amount of time, the first general environmental laws were passed, and in 1994 the National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) was created to coordinate all governmental offices 4 involved with environmental jurisdiction (for example, the departments of transport, economy, and fisheries) and to design new policies to deal with pollution problems. Since then, CONAMA has promoted implementation of additional trading programs for other stationary sources and pollutants. The actual implementation and management of these programs has however remained under SEREMI.
The fact that institutions and actual regulation evolved so quickly-in some cases simultaneously or even superseding legal bases-may have complicated implementation. Trading is officially "recognized" as a policy instrument by the law that created CONAMA. However, the law did not specify the allocation mechanisms, duration, or other characteristics of the permits schemes. Before this law, there was just a Supreme Decree, rather than a law, which established a specific program for large boilers. Although the large boiler decree was passed in 1992, the firms were only given permits and transactions recorded in 1997.
The Large Boiler Program
The large boilers' program, which covered existing large boilers installed or approved before 1992, were endowed with particulate-matter emissions permits called "initial daily emissions" (IDE) . New large boilers, installed or approved after 1992, are required to offset their emissions fully through abatement of existing older large boilers; in other words, new sources needed to buy permits from old ones. Thus, credits are created existing large boilers reduce their emissions more than cap set by a pre-specified and individual daily standard, and they can transfer these credits to another existing or new source. Although sources can propose trades, the final 4 See Pizarro 2007. decision to create the credits and allow the transfers rests with SEREMI. In this sense, the program is an intermediate step between the early credit-based "bubbles" or "open market trading" schemes and the allowance-based cap and trade policies in the United States (initiated for sulfur pollution). In credit-based trading, credits can be created if one source reduces its emissions more than required by some pre-specified standard and transfers the credit(s) to another source, which can use them to offset its emissions. However, trading is confined by regulatory approval. On the other hand, in allowance-based trading, rights are initially created and distributed to sources, and there is no presumption that individual sources will limit emissions to the number of allowances they receive. They are free to trade allowances and the only requirement is that allowances equal emissions at the end of every compliance period (Ellerman 2005 ).
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The daily cap on emissions of existing large boilers was calculated according to a formula that allowed them to emit a maximum rate, given by the maximum hourly gas flow rate (m 3 /hour) from their stack, an assumed emissions concentration of 56*10 -6 (kg/m 3 ), and an assumed operating time of 24 hours per day. As the program progressed, the environmental authority realized that its initial allocation was too generous. In 2000 the targeted emission concentration was decreased to 50*10 -6 (kg/m 3 ), and again to 32*10 -6 (kg/m 3 ) in 2005. The offsetting rate-the number of permits new sources need to buy from existing sources in order to emit 1 kilogram of particulate matter-was also modified. Initially, it was set at 1, but in 1998 it was increased to 1.2, and in 2000 to 1.5. All these changes imply a devaluation of the permits held and/or tougher demands for new sources. 6 Permits were granted in "perpetuity" (but amendments to the quantities were made without compensation) and operators were restricted to trade permits on a permanent basis. 7 This feature of the program makes banking and borrowing of 5 In practice, credit-based systems have been hampered by high transaction costs associated with the creation and transfer of credits and the process of regulatory approval. By comparison, trading observed in allowance-based (such as RECLAIM and Acid Rain Program) has been more active. 6 Notice that this rule implies that the number of permits is reduced progressively through trading, i.e., if one kilogram of particulate matter is traded twice (after the year 2000), the last owner is allowed to emit just 0.75 kilograms. 7 The sale is not denominated in "tons of PM" but instead in "tons of PM/year". The buyer cannot just buy a ton for say 2009 but has to buy the "permanent" right to emit a ton of PM every year. As pointed out by Coria and Sterner (2008) and Montero et al. (2002) , the main consequence of this feature is to reduce market liquidity since sources are uncertain about the availability of permits in the future. This may explain why buyers appear to pay prices close to their choke prices, even when there is an aggregate over-supply of permits. On the other hand, in the recent report by Tirole (2009) 
Regulation of Large Industrial Processes
Two additional emissions trading programs were implemented in 2004 for particulate-matter and NOx pollution by large industrial processes. 9 As in the large boiler program, existing sources were granted permits, but this time yearly caps on emissions were set on a target cap based on 1997 emissions levels. The formula allowed industrial processes to emit a maximum of 50% of actual 1997 of particulate matter emissions and 67% of 1997 NOx emissions, and was calculated to reach the target by May 2007. (For NOx, a second, more stringent target of 50% was also imposed for 2010.) These new programs shared most of the features of the large boiler program, with one important exception: short-term offsetting was allowed. Thus, existing processes could "rent" emission permits for a minimum period of one year.
The main motivation behind short-term offsetting was to help start up a market by sending price signals, while giving new sources access to permits, because initially there was an aggregate lower level of NOx emissions. Calfucura et al. (2009) highlighted the effect of the lack of natural gas in explaining this shortage. includes sources participating in all the trading programs, "old" sources endowed with (grandfathered) emission permits, and some "new" sources that are required to fully offset their emissions. In the rest of this section, we discuss the primary findings of our questionnaire under five separate headings: market Information, sanctions and penalties, regulatory uncertainty, institutional arrangements. Finally, we discuss the relative importance of the shortcomings of the programs.
The Lack of Market Information about Partners, Prices, and Technological Options
Due to the public-good nature of some information, the market tends not to provide enough, so the government may need to consider collective action to obtain it.
Harrison (1999) highlighted the role of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's annual auctions and publicly-available reports of early trades and regular brokers' reports.
They significantly contributed to the functioning of the permit market in the initial stages of the sulphur dioxide (SO 2) program in the United States by offering price information needed to make investment and compliance decisions.
SEREMI is, in principle, in charge of keeping updated records of valid permits, as well as information on trading procedures. It does keep paper records, for instance, of requests to sell permits. However, in practice, each trade is a complicated "case" that takes months to resolve and the actual price (if indeed there is a transaction) does not need to be officially reported. The agency merely gives authority to trade: as a result, there is no marketplace and no systematic record of previous transactions for firms.
Furthermore, firms are not required to give the price of the emissions trade. Because many transactions occur between various sources of the same firm, there may not even be an explicit price. SEREMI, therefore, is incapable of providing any simple, accessible summary data on trades and prices.
14 Although some brokers have fulfilled part of these needs-and thus reduced transactions costs, while absorbing some costs as fees over the last years-a significant number of sources that told us they still had no idea what permit prices were and mentioned this as a barrier that might prevent them from trading.
In spite of a fairly high percentage of trading activity in our sample, we found that most respondents were unable to give estimates of the actual trade prices (less than 25% were able to give any price data for either selling or buying) 15 . Furthermore, because these data in principle must have referred to transactions at different dates, we did not find them useful for our analysis. However, we also asked firms to estimate the current permit price at the time of the interview. We found a fairly high amount of uncertainty concerning current prices. More than 30% of the respondents were unable to give estimates. In the particulate matter program, the highest estimate was eight times the lowest estimate, while in the NOx program highest to lowest ranged from 1:4 (see figure 1 ). The average price in the particulate matter program was US$ 6,718
and in the NOx program, US$ 12,990. According to brokers, current market prices are US$ 7,850 for 1 kilogram of particulate matter and US$ 9,600 for 1 ton of NOx. Hence, prices are on average underestimated for particulate matter, while it is overestimated on average for NOx.
There seems to be a negative correlation between the errors in price estimation and trading activity, in other words, firms that have made trades have better information 15 The large rate of "intra-firm" trading partly explains the lack of historical information about prices. As reported by Coria and Sterner (2008) , around 76% of the transactions corresponded to intra-firm trading (within firms), while 24% corresponded to inter-firm trading (between firms).
of prices. However, the correlation is not significant, and a chi square test of the null hypothesis that firms that trade have better price information is also rejected.
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Prices have increased significantly during the last years due to the natural gas calculating a rental price of 1 ton NOx, using a 10% discount rate. This would give a price of around $1,300/ton, which can be compared to the tax rate in Sweden ($4,000) and France ($38). The Swedish tax is very high compared to all other schemes, and it is thus reasonable to say that the Chilean permit price is also fairly high.
Given the discussion above, it seems clear that price information is underprovided in these markets. This is also corroborated by the fact that virtually all respondents wanted more information, and 90%, for instance, said they would like to have a data management system, where firms could find information about potential sellers and buyers and prices. Also, firms stated that they wanted better (more) information. Of the respondents, 62% stated that most of the information they do have has been gathered on their own initiative rather than coming from the authorities.
17
Firms also stated that they wanted more information on options to offset emissions, abatement technology, and how to find partners for trading. Of the firms that have not traded, 71% said that if they needed to look for partners, they would do it by themselves or through brokers. On the other hand, in a free market, it is perhaps more surprising that as much as 29% would start by asking for assistance from SEREMI if they want to find a trading partner. Stranlund et al. (2002) stressed the importance of prevailing market prices on the compliance incentives faced by firms in emissions trading programs. 18 To 16 All test results are available from the authors upon request. Throughout the paper, we used chi square tests, to account for our variables being categorical. The chi square test is a test of distribution; however, detailed examination of the data allowed us to also draw inference on the means. 17 17% of the respondents stated that they have received most of their information from the environmental authority, while for 21% the industrial association has been the main source of information. 18 Naturally, there many other factors that can explain the compliance behavior as well. For example, Stranlund (2008) examined the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for pollution control. He showed that in equilibrium of a market for emissions rights with widespread noncompliance, guarantee that participants hold enough permits for their emissions, it is necessary that the expected penalty for emitting is far above the permit price; otherwise it would be cheaper to pay the penalty.
Lack of information on Sanctions for Violation
Beside the uncertainty concerning the current prices, we also found a fairly large uncertainty concerning the penalties to be imposed on sources in violation.
Indeed, because the regulator SEREMI uses its discretion to determine the size of the penalty or whether a penalty is applied at all, we found that most of our respondents were unclear about the magnitude of the economic and/or administrative penalties related to noncompliance. For instance, 80% said they wanted the environmental authority to clarify the penalties.
When penalties for noncompliance are not clear and are at the discretion of the regulator, they can easily be manipulated (Peterson 2004) . This is particularly the case when noncompliance is explained partially by the delayed answer of the regulator to an offsetting proposal by firms! Thus, because of the delay in the regulatory process, sources can gain several months of "unpunished" noncompliance just by requesting transactions or introducing offsetting proposals. When it comes to this issue, we asked firms if they believed that "most firms comply." We found (for particulate matter) that answers were quite evenly distributed between agreement and disagreement. For the NOx program, however, the general belief was that most firms do not comply. In questions about penalties, a large fraction of the firms believed that noncompliers "face severe punishments," including economic sanctions (64%).
However, a large fraction of firms also said that there were ways for firms to escape penalties (48%), that some firms preferred to pay the economic penalties instead of complying with their permit level (64%), and that the economic and/or administrative penalties for noncompliance should be higher (60%).
Interestingly, noncompliant firms agreed less about the existence of methods for firms to escape the penalties. Put another way, this means that compliant firms think that noncompliers escape penalties.
19
More than 60% of the respondents reported that it was not very costly to attain the regulated level for particulate matter or NOx. Firms mainly achieved targets by switching fuels (39.4%), installing abatement technology and improving the efficiency of the sources (36.6%), and offsetting emissions (14%). However, 86% stated that compliance costs have increased significantly since the natural gas crisis, and 80%
risk aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental quality, and lower aggregate violations. 19 The difference between the compliers and non-compliers is significant using a chi square test (p=0.068).
of the respondents said that noncompliance has increased due to lack of natural gas.
There is, however, a significant difference between national and international firms, 20 regarding the effects of the lack of natural gas and noncompliance. National firms seemed to believe that the natural gas crisis affected compliance to a larger extent than did international firms.
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We found that 68% of firms said that SEREMI monitors firms continuously, although 70% would like SEREMI to increase its monitoring of sources in the trading programs. This is a striking number, and one is tempted to see it as the result of a permit-based approach. With old-fashioned regulation, it was very unusual to find sources of pollution who asked for more frequent monitoring. As soon as regulations are transformed into pollution rights, however, they acquire some of the attributes of "property" and become valuable. Many sources realized that their permits are valuable, especially when monitoring and the whole system in general is more stringent.
Regulatory Uncertainty and Changes in the Rules
Property rights to the emission permits must be fully transferred for the market to work. Arbitrary regulatory interventions that affect the tenure of emission permits and hamper trade should be avoided. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with the Santiago programs. Changes in the rules and arbitrary interventions, such as changes related to rate of offsetting, reduction of EDIs, and expiration date, have been observed in all the programs implemented so far. We therefore took particular interest in studying whether firms knew about the changes and if changes in the rules hampered the willingness to trade and the liquidity of the market.
When it comes to the first question, firms were informed to a reasonable degree concerning the changes in the trading rules that have been implemented so far (see table 6 ). 20 In our sample, 19% of the firms are international in terms of ownership.
21 There is a difference in the distribution of attitudes about the effect of the lack of natural gas on noncompliance between international and national firms. This is tested using a chi square test (p=0.075). We enquired about the effects of the changing rules, focusing particularly on firms that did not trade permits. We found that 21.1% of the firms that have not traded permits preferred to keep permits in excess of their need, instead of selling them because "there is too much uncertainty about changes in the rules." Some 36.8%
did not trade because of planned expansion and 36.8 % because they had not needed to trade so far.
According to our surveys and interviews, the main consequences of the regulatory interventions were that firms thought that the permit price will go up because the supply of permits is going down permanently (27.1%), and that industry will have to move out of Santiago (27.8%). However, a large fraction of firms believed that the changes will cause also ongoing investment in cleaner technologies (23.3%)
and that eventually emissions permits will disappear due to the progressive reduction of permits every time they trade (21.1%).
The Institutional Arrangement
As mentioned in section 2, two governmental offices are involved in the development of trading schemes in Santiago. Chile's environmental protection agency, CONAMA, is at least partly responsible for the design of the trading policies, while SEREMI is in charge of actual implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of the policies. This institutional arrangement has created some agency problems (Pizarro 2007 ) because SEREMI's performance is not measured by indicators related to the trading program, but by health indices. In addition, CONAMA and SEREMI tend to hold opposite views about how to deal with Santiago's air pollution problems. CONAMA wants to use flexible policies, such as trading schemes, while SEREMI is more concerned about the systematic increase in the health costs from pollution in Santiago (Calfucura et al. 2009 ). These two views affect the way they interact with firms:
CONAMA has a more cooperative attitude than SEREMI when it comes to trading procedures, for instance.
Has the institutional arrangement affected firms' attitude toward the environmental authorities? It is common to find that firms are negative toward the environmental authorities that regulate them. In Santiago's programs, however, we found that firms were only moderately critical. In fact, they were quite divided on whether the environmental authorities were understanding and helpful to business interests or not. Both CONAMA and SEREMI received fairly neutral ratings. There was however a difference in the distribution of attitudes towards CONAMA versus SEREMI between small and large firms, 22 as well as between national firms (in terms of ownership) and international firms. 23 Larger firms seemed to prefer CONAMA, while national firms seemed to be more negative toward both environmental authorities.
Firms did not find the authorities helpful in facilitating permit trades. Of our respondents, 62% found CONAMA unhelpful, compared to 72% for SEREMI. The distribution of a negative attitude toward SEREMI differed between larger and smaller firms, as well as between firms in violation and compliant firms.
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Attitudes concerning collaboration were corroborated by their answers to questions about the purpose and effects of the program. Firms had a reasonable view of the main purpose of trading schemes. Mainly they cited "freezing emissions"
(36.4%) and "promoting abatement" (30.3%), but also relocation of industry outside Santiago (16.7%). A few firms, however, mentioned the theoretical outcome of "meeting environmental targets at minimum cost" (13.6%).
Firms had mixed opinions on whether the schemes actually constrained industrial activities in Santiago. For the particulate mater program, only around half the participants agreed to the statement that the "permit programs prevented industry from growing in Santiago"; the NOx program had a somewhat higher share of agreement, mainly from firms in violation. 25 Many of the firms, however, answered 22 We used a chi square test to test the hypothesis that the distribution of the attitude toward CONAMA versus SEREMI differed between large firms and small firms. We rejected the hypothesis (p = 0.082), i.e., the distribution differed between the two types of firms. This result can be due to the fact that large firms are either more positive to CONAMA than small firms or more negative to SEREMI than small firms (or both). A positive bias can be due to the fact that large firms can affect CONAMA's decisions to a greater extent than small firms through industrial organizations. A negative bias towards SEREMI, on the other hand, can be due to the fact that it is the authority responsible for the enforcement of the programs. 23 We used a chi square test to test the hypothesis that the distribution of the statement that firms disagree more whether CONAMA and SEREMI are helpful and understanding to business interests does not differ between national and international firms. We rejected the hypothesis (CONAMA: p = 0.021 and SEREMI: p = 0.020). 24 Larger firms (p = 0.082) and firms in violation (p = 0.049). The meant that, using a t-test, they did however not differ significantly. 25 We used a chi square test to test the hypothesis that firms in violation to a larger extent than complying firms agreed to the statement that the "permit programs prevented industry to grow in Santiago" (p = 0.061).
that the programs have affected industry competitiveness negatively in the Santiago area (62%). Again, firms in noncompliance were more negative on this point. 26 We also inquired about the firms' views of the appropriate institutions. Most firms (86%) preferred to deal with one single governmental authority, rather than the split authority between CONAMA and SEREMI that now exists. However, we also learned that most firms wanted enforcement separated from appeal (68%). Currently, SEREMI issues and follows up on regulations in Chile and serves as a board of appeals.
In other countries, there are separate boards (or courts) of appeal that deal with the resolution of conflicts between authorities and firms. This might be one feature that the Chilean authorities should consider developing.
Finally, 94% of our respondents would like more diligence, efficiency, and timeliness, when it comes to the trading procedure, which is reported to take between 3 and 12 months.
The Relative Importance of the Shortcomings of the Programs
It is not easy to say which failure has affected the performance of the trading programs to the greatest extent. However, when asked outright to ranking the elements that have negatively affected trading in Santiago, lack of information had the highest priority (42%), followed by the lack of diligence by the environmental authority (28%), and unclear rules (20%) that change all the time (8%). Indeed, 54% of the respondents who reported difficulties when trading stated that the main problem was the lack of clear information to accomplish the trading process.
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Have the pitfalls in the implementation of the trading schemes affected the attitude of the industry towards trading? It seems that they have. Of our respondents, 58% said that it would be better if the environmental authority used a different policy to control emissions. Interestingly, national firms disliked trading permits the most.
28
Emissions standards (42%), technology regulations (40%), and emissions taxes (18%) were mentioned as substitute regulations.
26 p = 0.062 27 Questions on the lack of clear information to accomplish the trading process were included in the questionnaire in three situations: 1) finding a trading partner without any public information, 2) understanding the rules behind the trading process, and 3) uncertainty regarding the approval of the transaction. 28 National firms disliked trading permits more than international firms (p = 0.064).
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY
We can draw some interesting conclusions from our in-depth study of the firms participating in the environmental trading programs in Chile. First, we want to highlight some positive findings. In sharp contrast to the general view that firms are reluctant to embrace environmental regulation, we found that firms in the Santiago programs did not have a general negative attitude toward environmental regulations or environmental authorities. Furthermore, they did not seem reluctant to deal with environmental regulations; this was particularly true for firms with international terms ownership.
Interestingly, we also found that a large fraction of the firms demanded a stricter monitoring of sources in the trading programs. In old-fashioned regulation, it is unusual to find sources of pollution that ask for more frequent monitoring. We are tempted to say that this is likely to be the result of using a permit-based approach. When the regulations are transformed into pollution rights, they acquire some of the attributes of "property" and become valuable. Many sources realize that their permits are valuable-and in fact are more valuable if the monitoring and the whole system in general is more stringent. However, firms were dissatisfied with the implementation of the policies. This dissatisfaction seemed to correlate with lack of information about the policies and the lack of enforcement.
Our findings allow us to offer a few clear policy recommendations. The most fundamental suggestion is that greater clarity is needed concerning the exact nature of the rights handed out and the exact penalties in case of noncompliance. Firms need to be able to predict the results of their actions with a minimum of time and cost and a maximum of accuracy. It is also important to improve the flow of information to firms by enhancing public information about trading, such as historical records and forecasts.
Also, because many firms stated that it was possible to escape penalties and that a significant fraction of the firms do not comply with the environmental regulations, disclosing information about compliance records could increase the credibility of the program and lead to standardization of the enforcement procedures.
Unclear regulations are not only unfortunate in themselves but they can provide opportunities for rent seeking by officials. Creating a simple and stable system of regulations and making enforcement transparent and evenly applied has the additional benefits of reducing transaction costs and risks of corruption Even if only a small fraction of the firms in our study were reluctant to trade, due to the change in the offsetting rate (permits are depreciated progressively through trading), we strongly advise policymakers to avoid such rules because they create disincentives to trading in the long run.
Finally, we suggest some changes in the institutional setting. Even if most firms preferred a single environmental authority, we do not think that this is the reason underlying the current problems. Rather, the problem is that the two authorities (CONAMA and SEREMI) do not pursue the same objectives. While CONAMA is responsible for the design of the trading programs and is focused on environmental policy, SEREMI pursues many other objectives related to the health of the population in general. While we do not see a big problem with two authorities being responsible for different aspects of environmental emissions trading, we do believe that the authority in charge of enforcement should be autonomous and pursue this objective only. This also applies to the separation of enforcement and appeal. This is an important modification of the existing programs that the Chilean authorities should develop.
All in all, we conclude that the trading programs in Santiago, Chile, suffer from serious flaws in design and implementation. Rights need to be clarified, as do sanctions. Institutions need to become more efficient and transparent. On the other hand, these flaws are not necessarily more severe than some of the flaws in the recently designed European ETS system. One could point to the fact that it took the United States several decades of experimentation before they arrived at its current market design. Chile has managed to establish environmental trading schemes in a relatively short time, during which they also developed the legal bases and institutions.
It is hard to judge what this implies for other countries, but it seems clear that countries with similar income levels and institutional maturity as Chile should be able to develop well-functioning permit trading schemes. This should apply to most of the middle-income or "emerging" countries of Latin America or Asia, as well as countries at comparable levels of development in Africa, such as South Africa. One should also remember that many of the other policy options to permit trading, such as taxation, also imply a need for sophisticated monitoring and institutions. It is not clear that trading schemes require significantly more "maturity," nor is it certain that institutional maturity should be a definitive criterion when judging which countries can and should develop trading schemes. More practical experience is needed here. 
APPENDIX

A1. Questionnaire
The purpose of this study is to understand how firms have dealt in practice with the tradable permit programs implemented in Santiago during the last decade.
As you probably know, there are several programs intended to reduce emissions coming from industrial sources. During the 1990s, one program was intended to reduce particulate matter's emissions coming from large boilers, and recently a new program was implemented to reduce emissions of particulate matter and nitrogen oxides coming from large industrial processes.
Finally, some of the projects involved in SEIA have to present proposals to offset the emissions they produce. The alternatives available for this include, for example, forestation and paving of streets.
All these programs have been in existence for some time and it is important to know the difficulties that regulated firms have faced in order to propose changes to make them clearer and more efficient. Therefore, the purpose of this interview is to understand your experience with these policies and ask your opinion about them. We would like to know if these policies have suited the needs of your firm and if there are changes that could improve the policies in the future.
Before starting we want to thank you for your time and your willingness to participate in this study. We also want to assure you that the information you give will remain confidential and will be used only for academic purposes.
Introduction
Environmental quality in Santiago has historically been bad. Environmental regulations are needed to alleviate pollution problems, but environmental regulations can also affect businesses' profitability. The environmental authority can also look at policies that are more in line with firms' interests. The following questions are intended to elicit your opinion about whether or not the environmental authority has made these two targets more compatible. If you sold permits:
What was the main reason that your firm traded permits?
_____ The boiler or industrial process was shut down and the excess permits were not planned to be used.
_____ Your firm installed abatement technologies that allowed you to sell excess emission permits.
_____ Your firm wanted to take advantage of extra permits before they become void.
_____ Your firm had economic problems and selling the permits would help to increase your firm's liquidity. _____ the process is too slow and bureaucratic.
_____ the process is too discretional. In the end, there is no certainty whether the transaction will be approved.
_____ Other___________________________________________________________
In the case of firms that did not trade emission permits
Why did your firm not trade permits?
_____ You did not know your firm had permits.
_____ So far, you have not found a trading partner.
_____ There is too much uncertainty about changes in the rules. It is better to keep the permits for your existing sources. 
A2. Changes in the Regulation
After the trading program was implemented, the environmental authority made several changes to the initial rules of the program in order to reduce the total quantity of permits. Thus, the rate of offsetting emissions (the number of permits new sources need to buy from existing sources in order to emit 1 kilogram of particulate matter) was initially equal to 1, but in 1998 it was increased to 1.2, and increased again in 2000 to 1.5.
At the same time, the quantity of emission permits initially granted to existing sources was reduced twice. Using the quantity of permits existing sources received in 1997 as a reference, the quantity was reduced by 10% in 2000, and reduced by an additional 32% in
2005.
Finally, permits have an expiration date. Sources that cease operations have three years to sell their permits before they become void. _____ The alternatives available were economically unfeasible.
Did you know about these changes?
Yes
_____ The process to get the project approved was too slow and bureaucratic.
_____ The process to get the project approved was too discretional. At the end, it was not certain whether the project was going to be approved. 
_____ Other___________________________________________________________
How long did it
